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Abstract 
 This research examines how the reliance on emotional feelings as a heuristic influences 
the proposal of offers in negotiations. Results from three experiments based on the classic 
ultimatum game show that, compared to proposers who do not rely on their feelings, proposers 
who rely on their feelings make less generous offers in the standard ultimatum game, more 
generous offers in a variant of the game allowing responders to make counteroffers, and less 
generous offers in the dictator game where no responses are allowed. Reliance on feelings 
triggers a more literal form of play, whereby proposers focus more on how they feel toward the 
offers themselves than on how they feel toward the possible outcomes of these offers, as if their 
offers were the final outcomes. Proposers relying on their feelings also tend to focus on gist-
based, simpler construals of negotiations that capture only the essential aspects of the situation. 
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From salary demands to the amount of TV a child is allowed to watch, negotiation is an 
integral part of everyday life. A powerful framework for studying negotiation processes is the 
ultimatum game (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). In this game two players have to split 
a given amount of money. One player, the “proposer,” makes an offer, which the other player, 
the “responder,” either accepts or rejects. If the offer is accepted the money is split accordingly; 
if it is rejected both players receive nothing. Although this game is ostensibly simple, its 
psychology can be quite intricate. This is especially true for proposers who have to select an 
offer with a payoff that is contingent on the responder’s response. According to traditional, 
computational models of decision making, the selection of offers will entail explicit 
considerations of the likelihood that offers of a given size will be accepted by the responder. For 
example, proposers selecting their offers based on expected utility would assess the utilities 
associated with different offer sizes and weight them by the probabilities that these offers would 
be accepted by the responder. Similarly, a proposer behaving like a rational economist would 
anticipate that any positive offer would be accepted by a rational responder (because any positive 
offer should be more attractive than receiving nothing in the case of rejection), and therefore 
make the smallest possible offer. According to other models of decision making, however, 
explicit considerations of the responder’s likely responses need not take place.  
Human decision making often is not driven by computational “cognitive” processes but 
by noncomputational affective processes (Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Pham, 2004). In particular, 
decisions are often based on a monitoring of one’s subjective feelings toward the options, which 
are interpreted as indicative of the options’ relative value. This process is variously known as the 
“how-do-I-feel-about-it?” heuristic in social psychology (Schwarz & Clore, 1988) and consumer 
psychology (Pham, 1998), the “affect heuristic” in behavioral decision research (Slovic, 
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Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002), and the “somatic marker hypothesis” in some 
neuroscience circles (Damasio, 1994). How does this reliance on emotional feelings influence 
the selection of offers in the ultimatum game? 
Our research suggests that the reliance on feelings as a heuristic triggers a more literal 
form of play in the ultimatum game. Specifically, proposers who rely on their feelings tend to 
have simpler representations of the game and select offers based on their feelings toward the 
offers themselves as opposed to the eventual outcomes of these offers, which depend on their 
likelihood of acceptance by the responder. This literal form of play results in less generous offers 
in the standard ultimatum game, more generous offers in a variant of the game allowing a 
counteroffer from the responder, and less generous offers in a “dictator” version of the game not 
allowing any response from the responder. 
The “Feels Right” Heuristic and the Literal Play Hypothesis 
The reliance on feelings as a decision heuristic entails a monitoring of one’s feelings 
toward the target and a weighting of these feelings that is proportional to their perceived 
informativeness (Pham, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Emotional feelings have been shown to 
weigh more heavily on judgments and decisions when they are perceived to be representative of 
the target (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), when they are perceived to be relevant to the decision 
maker’s goals (Pham, 1998), and when they are momentarily trusted as a decision guide (Avnet 
& Pham, 2007). However, the reliance on feelings as a heuristic does more than just increase 
their weight in judgments and decisions: it also triggers a qualitatively distinct form of decision 
making (see Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Pham, 2007 for reviews).  
Compared to more “cognitive” decisions, feeling-based decisions tend to be more 
imagery-based, with greater dependence on concrete mental pictures of the targets (Kahneman & 
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Snell, 1990; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). This is because genuine feelings are 
more likely to be accessed through concrete mental representations of the target (Pham, 1998). In 
addition, because the affective system rests heavily on the assignment of targets to categories 
from which affective markers can be retrieved (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Pham, 2007; Pham, 
Cohen, Pracejus, & Hughes, 2001), people relying on their feelings are particularly sensitive to 
their ability to identify the target unambiguously (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2006).  
In ultimatum settings, if proposers using their feelings as a heuristic rely more on mental 
pictures and place more weight on being able to identify the target unambiguously, they should 
focus on the offers themselves as opposed to their possible outcomes. Indeed, the offers 
themselves should be easier to mentally picture and categorize (e.g., “20% feels too greedy”) 
than their responder-dependent outcomes, which are inherently uncertain. This prediction is 
consistent with the finding that, compared to reason-based evaluations, affect-based evaluations 
are less sensitive to probability information (Loewenstein et al., 2001). For example, willingness 
to pay to avoid unpleasant affective prospects (e.g., electric shocks) is less sensitive to the 
probability of the prospects than willingness to pay to avoid nonaffective negative prospects 
(e.g., losing $20; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001).  
In addition, feeling-based decisions tend to be more “gist-based” (Reyna & Brainerd, 
1995). That is, decision makers relying on their feelings are more likely to invoke condensed 
representations of the essence (or “gist”) of the situation than decision makers who rely on 
computational processes, who tend to invoke more intricate representations of the situation 
(Epstein & Pacini, 1999). If the reliance on feelings increases the reliance on gist, in ultimatum 
settings, proposers relying on their feelings should have simpler construals of the game, 
capturing its essence. Specifically, they should construe the game more literally along its stated 
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rules, whereas proposers who rely on computational processes should have more elaborate 
construals that also include various implications of the rules such as likely responses of the 
responder to various offers and other considerations.  
Overall, in the ultimatum game the reliance on feelings as a heuristic should result in a 
more literal form of play whereby proposers are likely to represent the game more simply and to 
focus on their feelings toward the offers themselves as opposed to the outcomes of these offers. 
In other words, they should tend to treat their offers as if they were the eventual outcomes of the 
game. We tested this conceptualization in three incentive-compatible experiments in which 
participants played as proposers against another person whom they believed was real and were 
compensated based on the offers they made. To manipulate participants’ reliance on feelings 
while playing the game, we used Avnet and Pham’s (2007) trust-in-feelings manipulation 
(TFM), which varies the perceived diagnosticity of feelings in judgments and decisions while 
holding constant the cognitive and emotional content of the task. Building on the ease-of-
retrieval effect (Schwarz et al., 1991), this manipulation manipulates the momentary trust that 
people have in using their feelings as a heuristic by varying the perceived availability of past 
instances of successful reliance on feelings in decisions. Avnet and Pham (2007) show that, 
compared to participants exposed to the low-trust-in-feelings version of this manipulation, 
participants exposed to the high-trust-in-feelings version are more influenced both by feelings 
evoked by the target and by their mood states in evaluations and invoke a greater number of 
feeling-based considerations to justify their evaluations.  
Experiment 1 involved a standard ultimatum game, where the responder could only 
accept or reject the offer. If proposers who rely on their feelings as a heuristic tend to focus on 
their feelings toward the offers themselves rather than on whether they will be accepted, they 
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should make lower offers than proposers who rely less on their feelings. Experiment 2 involved a 
variant of the game where the responder was allowed to make a counteroffer. If proposers who 
rely on their feelings tend to treat their offers as if they were the final outcomes of the game, 
adding this extra layer of response (by the responder) should have less influence on their offers 
compared to the standard ultimatum game than on the offers of proposers who rely less on their 
feelings. Experiment 3 involved a “dictator” variant of the game where the responder was forced 
to accept the offer. If proposers who rely on their feelings represent this game more literally 
around its gist (a mere allocation task), they should make lower offers than proposers who rely 
less on their feelings who would factor in nonessential considerations such as fairness. 
Experiment 1: Standard Ultimatum Game 
 Proposers who rely on their feelings should focus on the offers themselves, and thus pay 
less attention to the responder’s possible responses and the possibility of lower offers being 
rejected. To them, offers that are somewhat less generous are more likely to “feel right.” It was 
therefore predicted that proposers who rely more on their feelings would make less generous 
offers than those who rely less on their feelings.   
Method 
 Sixty students participated as proposers in exchange for a $5 fee plus up to $20 based on 
performance. The momentary trust that participants had in their feelings (higher or lower) was 
manipulated between-participants; the amount to be allocated ($5 or $15) was manipulated 
within-participant.  
The experiment was administered in two supposedly unrelated studies. In the “first” 
study, participants’ momentary trust in their feelings was manipulated using the TFM. 
Participants in the higher-trust-in-feelings (higher-TF) condition were asked to list 2 instances of 
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successful past reliance on feelings in decisions, whereas participants in the lower-trust-in-
feelings (lower-TF) condition were asked to list 10 such instances. Avnet and Pham (2007) have 
shown that participants asked to identify two such situations find it easy, which increases their 
trust in their feelings and therefore their reliance on feelings. Conversely, participants asked to 
identify 10 such situations find it difficult, which decreases their trust in their feelings and 
therefore their reliance on feelings. We tested this manipulation in the context of ultimatum 
games among 36 participants. After completing the TFM, they were asked to assume the 
proposer role and describe how they would decide on an offer by rating their agreement with 
three 7-point items (e.g., “I would trust my feelings”; α = .81). Participants in the two-situation 
(high-trust) condition were more likely to report trusting their feelings to decide on an offer (M = 
5.20, SD = .91) than participants in the 10-situation (low-trust) condition (M = 4.33, SD = 1.37, 
F(1, 34) = 5.15, ω2 = .10, p = .03, prep = .91).  
 In the “second” study, participants played the ultimatum game twice using a computer 
interface. Each round (counterbalanced across participants)1 involved either $5 or $15 and a 
different responder. Participants were led to believe that they would be playing in real time 
against another person at another university with whom they were connected via Internet (the 
responder was in fact computer-simulated). All participants were assigned the role of the 
proposer but were told that the roles were assigned randomly in each round. In each round 
participants were told the amount of money to be allocated and made their offer to the other 
player. They then estimated on a 0–100% scale the probability that the other player would accept 
it. Participants learned whether their offer had been accepted only after completing the two 
rounds. Consistent with typical responses observed in ultimatum games (Camerer, 2003), all 
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offers of at least 35 percent were accepted and all other offers were rejected by the simulated 
responder. Participants were paid accordingly.  
Results and Discussion 
 On average, participants offered 44.9 percent of the money to be allocated (SD = 11.4), 
consistent with typical offers in ultimatum games. More importantly, regardless of the amount of 
money to be allocated (F < 1), proposers with higher TF made somewhat less generous offers (M 
= 42.3%, SD = 8.83) than proposers with lower TF (M = 48.0%, SD = 9.25, F(1, 58) = 5.97, ω2 
= .08, p = .02, prep = .93; Fig. 1). This effect is consistent with the idea that proposers with higher 
TF focus on how they feel toward the offers themselves, paying less attention to the responder’s 
possible responses. Note that proposers with higher TF were not overly greedy; rather, they 
operated in a somewhat lower offer range (Fig. 2). Interestingly, 37 percent of the proposers with 
lower TF offered more than 50 percent of the amount. This seemingly surprising finding is not 
inconsistent with our theorizing. If proposers with lower TF pay more attention to their offers’ 
likelihood of acceptance, they may try to increase this likelihood by making overly generous 
offers.  
An alternative explanation for the lower offers of higher-TF proposers is that they were 
more optimistic about offers of a given size being accepted. However, when controlling for offer 
size, subjective estimates of the probability that the offer would be accepted were in fact lower 
among participants with higher TF (LS-M = 68.0%) than among participants with lower TF (LS-
M = 76.3%; F(1, 57) = 3.76, ω2 = .04, p = .06, prep = .87; Fig. 3). Moreover, while estimates of 
the probability that the offer would be accepted were predictive of offer size among participants 
with lower TF (r = .31, p = .02, prep = .93), they were not predictive among participants with 
higher TF (r = -.14, p = .25, prep = .68). This is consistent with the idea that greater reliance on 
Feeling Heuristic and Ultimatum Negotiations 
10 
 
 
feelings results in a more literal form of play that puts less emphasis on the responder’s likely 
responses.  
Experiment 2: Counteroffer Game 
 To further test the notion that proposers with higher TF pay less attention to the 
responders’ likely responses, we compared the offers made in the standard ultimatum game 
(Experiment 1) with those made in a variant of the game in which one layer of responder 
responses was added (this experiment). Rather than having to accept or reject the proposer’s 
offer, the responder could make a counteroffer, which the proposer then had to either accept or 
reject. If the reliance on feelings makes proposers treat their offers as if they were the final 
outcomes of the game, adding this counteroffer stage should have little influence on their offers. 
Among proposers with higher TF, offers in this counteroffer game should thus be comparable to 
those made in the standard game (Experiment 1). In contrast, if the nonreliance on feelings 
triggers greater attention to how responders might respond to the offers, adding this counteroffer 
stage should have more influence on the offers made. Among proposers with lower TF, offers in 
this counteroffer game should differ from those made in the standard game.  
Method 
 Forty-seven participants whose trust in their feelings was manipulated played the above-
described counteroffer game as proposers for a $5 fee plus up to $15 depending on the outcome. 
The procedure was very similar to that of Experiment 1. After completing the TFM in a 
supposedly unrelated study, participants were explained the rules of the game and led to believe 
that they were playing against a real person (in fact computer-simulated). Participants were given 
$15, made an initial offer, and then estimated the probability that the other player would accept 
this offer without making a counteroffer. All offers greater than 50 percent were accepted, 
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whereas offers less than 50 percent elicited a counteroffer (randomly assigned across 
participants) requesting an additional 10 or 30 percentage points above the initial offer. 
Participants who accepted the counteroffer were paid accordingly; those who rejected it received 
nothing.  
Results and Discussion 
 The critical test of our conceptualization was not the comparison between the offers of 
higher versus lower TF participants within this counteroffer game, but the comparison between 
the offers that higher and lower TF participants made in this experiment relative to their 
counterparts in Experiment 1. As expected, there was an experiment-by-TF interaction (F(1, 103) 
= 9.04, ω2 = .07, p < .01, prep = .97; Fig. 1.). While proposers with higher TF made similar offers 
in the counteroffer game (M = 42.0%) as in the standard game (M = 42.3%, F < 1), proposers 
with lower TF made substantially lower offers in the counteroffer game (M = 34.5%) than in the 
standard game (M = 48.0%; F(1, 103) = 17.79, ω2 = .23, p < .01, prep = 1). Therefore, proposers 
with higher TF were less influenced by the addition of another layer of responder response than 
proposers with lower TF. This is consistent with the literal-play hypothesis that proposers with 
higher TF are less influenced by the possible responses of the responder than proposers with 
lower TF.  
Additional evidence comes from participants’ estimates of the probability that the initial 
offer would be accepted outright. These estimates were closer to those reported in Experiment 1 
among participants with higher TF (MCounteroffer = 57.1%, SD = 24.5 vs. MUltimatum = 68.0%, SD = 
18.1) than among participants with lower TF (MCounteroffer = 46.9%, SD = 26.3 vs. MUltimatum = 
76.3%, SD = 11.3; experiment-by-TF interaction F(1, 103) = 5.44, ω2 = .04, p = .02, prep = .92; 
Fig. 3). This is again consistent with the idea that in such games proposers with higher TF pay 
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less attention to the responder’s likely responses than proposers with lower TF. Furthermore, as 
in Experiment 1, estimates of the probability of acceptance of the initial offer were more 
predictive of the offer size among participants with lower TF (r = .78, p < .01, prep = 1) than 
among participants with higher TF (r = .58, p < .01, prep = .97; t = 2.12, p = .04, prep = .89).  
 Interestingly, whereas in Experiment 1 proposers with higher TF made somewhat less 
generous offers than those with lower TF, in this counteroffer experiment it was proposers with 
lower TF who made less generous initial offers (MLow-TF = 34.5%, SD = 16.4, MHigh-TF = 42.0%, 
SD = 10.4; F(1, 45) = 3.57, ω2 = .05, p = .07, prep = .86; see Fig. 1). Proposers with lower TF 
may have anticipated that the responder would likely counteroffer and thus “low-balled” their 
initial offers, whereas proposers with higher TF focused more on their feelings toward the offer 
itself as if it were the final offer.  
Experiment 3: Dictator Game 
 The first two experiments suggest that in settings where the responder is allowed to 
respond, the literal play triggered by the reliance on feelings involves a reduced consideration of 
the responder’s possible responses when making offers. How does the reliance on feelings 
influence offers in games where the responder’s responses are objectively irrelevant? This issue 
was examined in a dictator game where the responder could not reject the offer and was forced to 
accept it. Because the reliance on feelings entails a greater reliance on gist representations, 
proposers who rely on their feelings should be more likely to construe this game for what it is: a 
mere allocation task totally under their control. We therefore predicted that they would make 
lower offers than proposers who rely less on their feelings who may consider objectively 
nonessential factors such as fairness.    
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Method 
 Fifty-eight participants whose trust in feelings was manipulated played as proposers in 
the dictator game for a $5 fee plus up to $10 depending on their offer. The procedure was very 
similar to that of the previous experiments. After completing the TFM, participants were asked to 
allocate $10 between them and another allegedly real person who was to accept the offer. 
Participants were paid accordingly.  
Results and Discussion 
 Consistent with previous findings, the average offer (35.2%; SD = 21.1) was substantially 
lower than in the standard ultimatum game in Experiment 1 (44.9%). More importantly, 
participants with higher TF made significantly lower offers (M = 27.4%, SD = 22.3) than 
participants with low TF (M = 43.6%, SD = 19.6; F(1, 56) = 8.51, ω2 = .11, p < .01, prep = .97; 
Fig 1). This is consistent with the idea that proposers with higher TF interpreted the game more 
literally according to its gist than those with lower TF who behaved as though they were more 
concerned about the responder’s reactions, even though the offer could not be rejected.  
Note that proposers with higher TF made substantially lower offers in this dictator game 
(M = 27.4%) than in the standard ultimatum game (M = 42.3%, F(1, 114) = 13.37, ω2 = .16, p < 
.01, prep = .99). This suggests that in ultimatum-like negotiations proposers with higher TF do not 
completely ignore the fact that the other players can reject the offer. Rather, this fact seems to be 
captured in their gist representation of the game, thus shaping the range of options that “feel 
right” given the essence of the game.   
General Discussion 
 This research shows that the reliance on feelings as a heuristic changes the way offers are 
made in negotiations. This phenomenon was demonstrated across three experiments using a 
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manipulation of reliance on feelings that varies the perceived diagnosticity of feelings without 
changing the feelings (unlike mood manipulations). Compared to proposers with lower TF, 
proposers with higher TF were found to make less generous offers in the standard ultimatum 
game, more generous offers when a counteroffer was allowed, and less generous offers in the 
dictator game. Overall, the reliance on feelings appears to trigger a more literal form of play. 
Proposers with higher TF seem to focus more on how they feel toward the offers themselves than 
on how they feel toward the possible outcomes of these offers, as if their offers were the final 
outcome of the negotiation. This is presumably because feeling-based decisions entail a mental 
picturing of the options, and it is easier to picture the offers themselves than their inherently 
uncertain outcomes. Feeling-based decisions also involve greater reliance on gist representations, 
resulting in simpler, essence-based construals of these types of negotiations.  
In negotiations, proposers who rely on their feelings therefore appear to place less weight 
on the other party’s potential responses, whether these responses are logically relevant (standard 
ultimatum and counteroffer games) or irrelevant (dictator game). This is not to say that proposers 
who rely on their feelings completely ignore the potential for the other party to respond when 
they can reject or counteroffer. Proposers who rely on their feelings do seem to recognize this 
potential, as evidenced by the contrast between their standard ultimatum offers and their much 
lower dictator offers. We believe that when proposers rely on their feelings, the relative position 
of power implied by the rules of the game is central to their gist representation of the negotiation, 
which shapes whether offers “feel right” to them. In their minds, the gist of the standard 
ultimatum game and the gist of the counteroffer game appear to be equivalent (i.e., the other 
player has some power), whereas the gist of the dictator game is quite different (i.e., the other 
player has no power).  
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Interestingly, across experiments, proposers with higher TF did not fare worse 
financially. In fact, compared to lower-TF participants, higher-TF participants made 6% more 
money in Experiment 1, near-identical amounts of money in Experiment 2, and 29% more 
money in Experiment 3. While not the main focus of this research, this ancillary finding echoes 
other findings suggesting that the reliance on affect in decision making is not necessarily 
disadvantageous (Damasio, 1994; Lee, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Pham, 2007).   
One limitation of this research is that participants did not actually play the games against 
a real opponent. They only believed they were. Although it is not clear why the results would be 
any different, it could be useful to replicate these effects in games with actual opponents. It 
would also be useful to test the literal play hypothesis in other economic games, as this form of 
play may reflect a more general, noncomputational process for approaching strategic decisions.  
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Footnotes 
1. There were no order effects (p’s >.45). 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean offer sizes across experiments. 
Figure 2. Distribution of offers in Experiment 1. 
Figure 3. Mean estimated probabilities of offer acceptance in Experiments 1 and 2.
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